Thomasius, continued to propound ethical systems based on altruistic love, stoic isolation, and psychological quietude. 8 Brought up in a backward social environment characterized by religious superstition, political repression, and economic stagnation, Thomasius could not be expected to embrace modernity in quite the same way in which his English counterpart Locke pursued it. His moral and political ideas, reflecting German conditions, differ markedly from those of Locke. In his political philosophy, for example, Thomasius was a proponent of "enlightened absolutism." The ideal of constitutional government, which he thought incompatible with man's corrupt nature, he classified under "sick forms of government."9
It would be misleading, however, to single out the traditionalism of German society as the only obstacle to Lockean ideas. Thomasius was not the best spokesman for Locke's philosophy. He was by profession a jurist and pursued philosophical problems only as an avocation. His philosophical treatises were little more than practical manuals, designed to turn young gentlemen into civilized human beings. Compared to Wolffs imposing tomes, the works of Thomasius appear pathetically slender. In place of magnificent categories, divisions, and subdivisions, Thomasius offered a few common sense maxims (Handgriffe). In choosing this popular manner of exposition, he committed a serious tactical error: by side-stepping all philosophical complexities, he lost his opportunity to establish an academic tradition that might have been able to compete with the reigning school of abstract rationalism. As it was, his empiricism hardly made a ripple in the vast sea of German rationalism. In eighteenth-century Germany, we must remember, the success or failure of a philosophic system depended largely on three factors: the influence of its author in the academic community, the manner of its exposition, and the quality of its disciples. Thomasius' philosophy failed on all three counts. The academic world, still thoroughly scholastic and traditional, regarded him as a bete noire because he had nothing but contempt for its traditional assumptions.10 His popular and eclectic treatment of ideas was also bound to be ineffective in a scholarly community which prized the "spirit of thoroughness" (Geist der Grundlichkeit, as Kant called it). As to Thomasius' followers, they were epigoni, who exercised little influence on German thought. Thomasius' students generally swelled the ranks of the obedient civil servants and became cautious legalists. Only a few followers of Thomasius, such as Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), master's system by laying greater emphasis on its empirical and practical aspects. Wolff himself had always insisted that philosophy must not be separated from the practical world, and he had followed up this conviction by paying due respect to empirical elements in his psychology and epistemology. This explains why his rationalism appeared as two-dimensional.17 All objects, Wolff said, should be viewed in terms of immutable as well as of probable truths-that is to say, for each field of reality there exists a knowledge of metaphysical concepts and of empirical facts. The two dimensions were to complement each other, though Wolff clearly thought the metaphysical of greater validity. Still, he was never tired of repeating that there are two ways of knowing: by experience and by reason. In psychology, for example, we must proceed in two ways, using a rationalistic psychology to discover the metaphysical concepts of the soul and an empirical psychology to prove their factuality.
In practice, Wolff was unable to maintain a radical dualism of two separate ways of knowing.18 The result of his endeavor to develop a rationalistic epistemology based on empirical foundations was that his rationalism was frequently at odds with his empiricism. This was most notorious in his psychology, and proved to be a source of embarrassment to his disciples. These weaknesses were noted by Wolff's opponents, who promptly exploited the concessions he had made to empiricism. In the 1760's his system was slowly transformed into a kind of popular eclecticism.'1 The following developments contributed toward the dilution of Wolffian rationalism: (1) his rationalistic epistemology became overshadowed by the concessions he had made to empiricism, (2) his scholastic mode of philosophizing was abandoned in favor of more informal modes of argumentation, and (3) his rigorous analytic-synthetic method was replaced by one of common sense or "sound reasoning."
III. The breakdown of Wolffian rationalism gave Locke a new, though not a permanent, lease on life in Germany. For approximately two decades (1755-75) a group of men, generally referred to as Popular Philosophers (Popularphilosophen), embraced distinctly empirical modes of thought. They admired Locke's reasonableness, his emphasis on sense experience, and his informal style of philosophizing. Their ideal, perhaps best expressed in J. J. Engel's work, "Der Philosoph fur die Welt," was the gentleman scholar who wrote philosophy during his "idle and heavy hours." These "philosophers of the world" believed in man's reasonableness and his eventual perfection. They taught their generation that this is the best of all possible worlds, that reason will gradually conquer superstition and ignorance, and that God has ordered the world in such a way as to increase happiness among all righteous men. It was a naive and, at times, trivial credo which the Popular Philosophers taught.20 Locke's ideas, then, were studied with renewed interest around midcentury by a group of litterateurs known as Popular Philosophers. His religious ideas were taken up by a group within Popular Philosophy which is often called Neologian, while his educational theories were greatly admired by that party within Popular Philosophy which styled itself "Philanthropinist." Finally, some of his ideas influenced a third party within Popular Philosophy-the so-called German empiricists. Though Locke was studied with great interest by these men, and was often cited approvingly, there is no evidence to suggest that the Popular Philosophers were Lockean.
The neological movement, comprising such figures as Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem (1709-89), August Friedrich Wilhelm Sack (1703-86), Joachim Spalding (1714-1804), Gotthilf Samuel Steinbart (1738-1800), and Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809), was at one with Locke on the simplicity, reasonableness, and, above all, humaneness of Christianity. The Neologians also shared Locke's aversion to dogmatic systems. At the same time, practically all Neologians disliked Locke's overly rationalistic theology, and rightly perceived that it would lead to a sterile and impersonal deism. The Neologians were greatly influenced by the emotional tenor of German Pietism, a theological cast of mind which Locke would have rejected as another variety of "enthusiasm." Jerusalem and the German Neologians believed that religion was essentially a private experience-subjectively felt rather than objectively demonstrated. There is a sustained tone of enthusiasm and emotional fervor in German Neology which is conspicuously absent in Locke. Compared to Jerusalem, Sack, or Spalding, Locke's theology exudes the rational spirit of the banking house. Where Locke, in Leslie Stephen's words, "plods steadily through the Gospels and the Acts, accumulating proof after proof,"21 the Neologians appeal steadily to the heart, to the beauty and harmony of nature, and to the certainty of subjective feeling.
The Neologians, then, shared some ideas with Locke, but went beyond Lockean rationalism to a more introspective theology. Beginning in the 1740's, and reaching its fruition in the last quarter of the century, German theology and philosophy became increasingly subjective and 20Many German historians have seized upon the shallow doctrines of the Popular Philosophers to condemn the whole Aufklirung as trivial. The Popular Philosophers were indeed trivial, but they do not represent the A ufklirung as a whole. To condemn the whole movement as "seicht" or "banausich" is to condemn Lessing, Wieland, Winckelmann, and Kant as trivial-judgments surely no one would wish to make. Wolff model of a unifying, holistic, and creative soul. Indeed, they often criticized Locke for minimizing the dynamic role played by the mind in producing ideas.
This stout-hearted defense of an autonomous soul was characteristic not only of German empiricism, but of German philosophy in general. Superficially, the history of German philosophy after 1750 appears as a struggle between two one-sided views of the mind: the innate model of Leibniz and the cash-register model expounded by English and French sensationalists. Strictly speaking, this impression is false. Not even the German empiricists could endorse the materialistic view of the mind. Of course, the German empiricists rejected Leibniz's theory of the self-sufficient monad, which they unanimously regarded as scientifically untenable. The external world, they insisted, simply could not be separated from the ego, and consequently had to be allowed to participate in consciousness. Between the ego and the world there is a constant interrelationship. Yet this relationship-and here the German empiricists refused to follow their English counterparts-is not a onesided affair, beginning and ending in sensation. Even if the material of thought is conveyed to the mind via the senses, it must still be registered, compared, united, classified-in short, transformed-by the mind itself. In processing the data of the senses, the mind imposes its own character upon them; and in so doing, displays its autonomy and self-activity.
We have here, by the German empiricists themselves, a reaffirmation of the rationalistic dictum that the senses must be intellectualized. In addition, we find that the German empiricists denied the converse, namely, that the intellect must be sensualized. Nothing is in the intellect, Locke had said, which has not previously been in the senses-to which Leibniz added the proviso "Except for the intellect itself." This celebrated statement, along with the Leibnizean caveat, now assumed renewed significance. Granted that all of our knowledge begins with experience, granted, further, that it must justify itself in experiential terms-the fact still remains that it must be validated by certain innate faculties of the mind which are transcendent in character.27
In their attempts to safeguard the spontaneous, autonomous, and, in a sense, the transcendental nature of the soul, while at the same time embracing the empiricist argument, the German empiricists clearly reveal their ambiguous position. They wanted very much to be empiricists in the English tradition. They hoped to treat the mind according to strict empirical laws, as set forth in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding or in Newton's Opticks. Yet, shuddering at the implied consequences-the example of David Hume's radical empiricism being ever present to their eyes-they recoiled to a variety of rationalistic 27This active and creative dimension of the soul is especially emphasized by Tetens, as when he said that "die Seele kann nicht nur ihre Vorstellungen stellen und ordnen, positions. We have the curious spectacle, then, of a number of German empiricists being attracted to English philosophy, while at the same time holding fast to German idealism. Not even Tetens, the supposed "German Locke," could accept English empiricism in its entirety, as his search for a "transcendental" knowledge reveals. In a key passage, Tetens epitomizes this unique position of German empiricism by saying that:
The British philosophers may serve as a model in the field of empirical observation, but certainly not in speculative philosophy.... It seems to me that our Leibniz has fathomed the human mind and its activities, especially in respect to transcendental knowledge, to a far greater degree of depth, accuracy, and clarity than the conscientious observationalist John Locke.28
Locke was not only a philosopher, but a major political ideologue. In point of fact, he is commonly called the founder of modern liberalism, a theory which is supposed to have been social dynamite in Western Europe and America. Yet, in Germany his political philosophy was greeted with universal insouciance-both by those who sympathized with his general philosophic outlook and those who did not. What accounts for this widespread lack of interest in Locke's political philosophy? One way to account for it is to recall that the typical form of government in eighteenth-century Germany was royal absolutism. With few exceptions, political thinkers glorified the authoritarian structure of society which prevailed everywhere. They owed their very existence to this order and consequently settled for a policy of splendid isolation as far as the world of politics was concerned. Intimidated by power, they preferred to study subjects which were not laden with political significance. The socio-economic context, then, explains in large part why they took so little interest in Locke's political writings. If any English political theorist commanded much respect in eighteenth-century Germany, it was Thomas Hobbes, not John Locke.
We have seen that Locke exerted little influence in Germany until the mid-eighteenth century, when his theories were studied with renewed interest by the Popular Philosophers-by the Neologians, the Philanthropinists, and the German empiricists. But it cannot be maintained, on that account, that the Popular Philosophers were Lockeans. Leibniz was, of course, only part of a tradition in German thought dating back to Paracelsus and Meister Eckhart, the mystical-idealistic tradition, which neither scholasticism nor modern physical science could suppress. When Newtonian science, of which Locke was the philosophic spokesman, appeared to conquer all other modes of thought, the idealistic tendency in Germany gained a new lease on life. Its chief task in the eighteenth century was to develop a qualitative ideology of science so that belief in the spiritual elements in man and nature could be preserved.41 Most German philosophers were appalled by the mechanistic view of science because it threatened to reduce man to little more than a machine. When Goethe and his fellow students read Holbach's Systeme de la nature, they were struck by its morbidness and "shivered in the manner of those who are frightened by growth, and in its development from potentiality to actuality. The idea that the present is pregnant with the future (charge du passe et gros de l'avenir) had very fruitful consequences in such fields as history, biology, literature, and art. Apart from being vital or dynamic, nature is also spiritual; and as such, it contains a purpose that transcends mere matter of factness. Here is already the germ of Romanticism, and it is present in the very heart of Enlightenment philosophy. In the final analysis, then, there was a powerful spiritualistic movement in German philosophy which stubbornly resisted the encroachments to British empiricism. This movement spiritualized nature, endowed the human soul with autonomous spontaneity, affirmed reason as the highest source of knowledge, and valued intuition more than common sense.
Nor can it be maintained that renewed interest in Locke and
V. By drawing attention to the influence of Locke's thought on the German Enlightenment where it actually existed, and by indicating the kind of obstacles it encountered, this essay has, I hope, put Locke's historical importance in proper perspective. Whatever his influence was in England or France, it was negligible in Germany. His philosophic impact on the German Enlightenment was always limited by native traditions inimical to his thought. His ideas could not compete with the Leibniz-Wolff system in which all German philosophers, including the Lockean sympathizers, were educated. It is true that around midcentury and beyond Locke attracted a certain following, but those who accepted his theories were minor figures and exercised very little influence on the future course of German philosophy.
Locke was slightly more fortunate in his religious and educational theories, though, here again, native traditions always exercised a strong counterpoise. His educational and religious ideas were accepted to the extent that they harmonized with local developments. When they did, as in the case of some German Neologians and Philantropinists, the problem arises whether they directly influenced the men in question or merely reinforced what was already present. Of all the Popular Philosophers, only Steinbart, Basedow, Feder, Meiners, and Tittel were under the direct spell of Locke-hardly a very impressive group of thinkers.
What, then, remains of the claim that Locke's influence pervaded the eighteenth century with a kind of scriptural authority? Obviously, in the light of what has been said, this judgment cannot be seriously maintained in the case of Germany. No one denies that Locke was wellknown and widely read in Germany. Being a major European philosopher, how could it be otherwise? But that he materially affected the direction of German thought, both in the Age of Enlightenment and beyond, is a claim that will not hold up under close historical scrutiny.
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